“# Global Memory EQUITY: MEMORY ## Is data center unprofitable? No, it is very profitable OP surges first, FCF follows with a time lag, and big techs have options to reassure FCF-sensitive investors Big tech shares fell sharply last week due to two concerns: (1) that AI is eroding…”
原始全文
# Global Memory EQUITY: MEMORY ## Is data center unprofitable? No, it is very profitable OP surges first, FCF follows with a time lag, and big techs have options to reassure FCF-sensitive investors Big tech shares fell sharply last week due to two concerns: (1) that AI is eroding legacy businesses, and (2) FCF has turned negative (although this has been well anticipated) despite rapid profit growth and might get more negative. We think the first is in fact a reason why big tech companies cannot cut investment, which, in our view, is not bad for semiconductors. The second would be a problem for big tech CFOs, whether they could resolve the issue with a range of financing tools such as operating leases, joint ventures and securitization of future cash flows, in our view. It is not a variable that changes semiconductor demand or the value of semiconductor companies. In our opinion, the market's reaction to semiconductor stocks is overdone. ## Two reasons for the sell-off The October sell-off reflects two overlapping concerns, in our view: AI cannibalizing legacy business, and negative FCF. Alphabet (GOOGL US, Not rated) fell 12% on 29 October, which is its largest single-day drop since its public listing (link). \- AI cannibalizing legacy businesses: Alphabet's search advertising growth slowed to 12% in 3Q, a five-quarter low, which media attributed to AI Mode in Search (link). Meta's (META US, Not rated) AI agent Muse, launched on 8 September, handles shopping and bookings on users' behalf and carries no ads. Amazon's (AMZN US, Not rated) decision to block Muse shows that agents can bypass existing shopping and ad funnels. Each company's AI now threatens the others' legacy businesses. \- Negative FCF, borrowing and new share issuance: Four big techs and Oracle (ORCL US, Not rated) have raised USD326bn of bonds in 2026, about three times the amount of 2025, according to S&P Global Market Intelligence. In 3Q, Alphabet issued USD28.7bn of bonds and USD12.4bn of stocks through an at-the-market program. The first concern is why investment cannot stop. In our view, the only way to defend the legacy business is to build AI competitiveness, so slowing investment is hard. That is, if anything, good news for semiconductors. The second concern is understandable for short-term investors, but treating a timing gap as an AI profitability problem is an overreaction, in our view. ## Why big tech must invest early 1. Performance scales with inference compute, not just training. Reasoning models and agents use far more tokens per answer, and post-training reinforcement learning is compute-intensive. Without enough compute, even a good model cannot be sold in volume. 2. Revenue is capped by capacity, not demand. Backlogs stand at USD560.8bn for Google Cloud (end-September), about USD496bn for AWS (part of Amazon) (end-June) and USD677bn of commercial remaining performance obligations for Microsoft (MSFT US, Not rated) (end-September, +73%) (Stock Titan). Microsoft said 3Q capex fell short of its USD50bn plan because third-party capacity was delayed. 3. Customers are data. Customer usage feeds the next model, and once enterprises wire workflows, data and agents into one model, switching becomes hard. Customers might try several models at first but are likely to settle on one or two. ## Research Analysts Asia Pacific Technology CW Chung - NIHK cwchung@nomura.com +852 2252 6075 ## Korea Technology ## Eon Hwang - NFIK eon.hwang@nomura.com +822 3783 2318 YJ Kim, CFA - NFIK yj.kim1@nomura.com +82237832332 The next three years of compute build-out are therefore likely to set a market structure, in our view. For a company that slows investment, the cost shows up less in near-term FCF than in its later market position. Profit and cashflow diverge: common in growth industries, a classic J-curve Current investment is highly profitable and lifts future growth; we believe the negative FCF comes from the lag in payback. Cloud operating margins are rising even as capex surges: in 3Q AWS reached 38.7% (vs. 34.6% a year earlier) and Google Cloud 36.2% (vs. 23.7%) (link). Some media are misreading: reading negative FCF as 'not making money' confuses profit with cash. Big tech companies' operating income is surging. In our view, the negative FCF is simply a result of time gap from paying cash today for equipment that will generate future revenue. 3Q cloud revenue accelerated for all three providers listed below, and margins rose with it. The combined 3Q cloud revenue of the three providers was about USD110bn, up about $56\%$ y-y. Google's cloud revenue rose $103\%$ y-y in 3Q, and as surging investment converts into revenue, the others' revenue and operating income should surge as well. \- AWS: Revenue of USD46.0bn (+39%), its fastest growth since 2021, with a 38.7% operating margin. It is growing close to 40% again at nearly three times the size. \- Azure: +48% (Microsoft, FY1Q27). Microsoft said capex fell short of plan because of third-party capacity delays, showing growth is constrained by capacity rather than demand. \- Google Cloud: Revenue of USD30.7bn (+103%), operating margin 36.2% (23.7% a year earlier). It includes TPU system sales, so its growth is not directly comparable with the other two. Backlog is USD560.8bn. Fig. 1: Big tech's y-y cloud revenue growth trend  Note: Azure data is based on "Azure and other cloud services" from the company's earnings data; Google Cloud revenue includes Workspace and TPU system sales. Source: Company data, Nomura research Fig. 2: Big techs' operating income keeps rising, while FCF traces a J-curve  Note: Based on combined earnings of four big techs (Alphabet, Meta, Amazon, Microsoft); 2025 figures are actual; 2026 figure is based on actual and company guidance; 2027 and onward is based on our estimates. Source: Company data, Nomura estimates \- Profit and cash timing: Capex leaves as cash in the year it is spent, while depreciation and revenue arrive 5-20 years after the assets go live. So while investment is accelerating, FCF can be negative even as operating income grows. \- Investment growth sets when FCF turns positive: If investment grows faster than cohorts pay back, negative FCF widens; once investment growth slows, installed capacity throws off cash and FCF rises quickly. If shares fall on negative FCF, we believe it offers a prime opportunity for long-term investors. \- Caution: The timing of the FCF trough and turn, and the slope afterwards, move with assumptions on investment growth, pricing and utilisation. Fig. 3: Earnings, depreciation, and operating cashflow For single cohort of investment  Note: "Cohort" means the assets invested in a given year; above chart is for an illustrative purpose to describe cashflow trend following an investment of 100, and does not describe any specific company's investment or return. Source: Nomura estimates  Note: Above chart is for an illustrative purpose to describe cashflows when investments for multiple cohorts happen across multiple periods, and does not desrcive any specific company's investment or return. Source: Nomura estimates ## Big tech's four options Big tech has four paths between investment and cash flow, in our view. We see a low probability of option 2 (a capex freeze, see the table below); it is more likely to keep the investment path of option 1 while adding the financing methods of options 3 or 4. Fig. 5: Big tech's four options between AI investments and cashflow Option (1) Accelerate investment (2) Freeze capex (3) (1) + JV / lease (4) (3) + forward sale of cash flows What it is Keep raising capex to meet demand Hold capex at 2026 level from 2027 A JV builds buildings/ power infrastructure; big tech leases them Sell the future cashflow of contracted enterprise customers now Near-term FCF More negative Improves sharply at once Less negative Can turn positive Long-term FCF/ revenue Highest Much lower Slightly below (1) (lease payments) Can turn positive Market position Secures lead At risk Same as in (1) Same as in (1) Balance sheet liabilities Rise for 2-3 years Little change Lower than (1) Depends on accounting Rating agencies are likely to interpret as... Higher debt Neutral Adds leases and guarantees to debt Depends on the financing structure Semiconductor demand Up Down Same as in (1) Same as in (1) Our view on probability Investment path maintained Low High(already underway) Medium-High Source: Nomura estimates Fig. 6: Big tech's annual FCF by scenario Scenario 2 and 4 lead in near-term; 1 and 3 lead later  Note: Above chart is for illustrative purpose and does not reflect actual figures/estimates. Source: Nomura estimates During the heavy investment years of 2027-2030F, options 2 and 4 would generate the highest FCF. Once investment growth slows, options 1 and 3, which do not give up growth, would generate the most. \- Option 1, accelerate investment (current expectation): Near-term negative FCF widens, but FCF rises quickly once investment growth slows. FCF duration simply lengthens, so a share-price fall might be an opportunity for long-term investors. \- Option 2, freeze capex: FCF improves immediately, but future revenue becomes much smaller. If a compute shortage pushes prices up, the Jevons paradox (cheaper compute driving more usage) also weakens. Negative for semiconductors, but unlikely, in our view, for the reasons mentioned above. \- Option 3, JV and operating lease instead of finance lease: The approach Meta used at Hyperion (link 1, link 2; Meta 20%, Blue Owl (OWL US, Not rated)-managed funds 80%, USD27.3bn of SPV bonds rated A+ by S&P, four-year renewable operating leases with a residual value guarantee). Building investment drops out of cash capex, at the cost of lease payments over the following 20 years. Big tech companies improve cash flow, and institutional investors such as pension funds gain a stable, higher-yielding asset. \- Option 4, partial monetization and forward sale of operating cash flows: Big tech keeps the equipment, operations, customer relationships and mark-up, and sells only the guaranteed cash flows that enterprise customers must pay to long-term investors such as pension funds and insurers. Cash arrives when investment peaks, and the price is a discount cost paid later. Under both US GAAP and IFRS, it is likely to be recognized as a liability (link), but it raises cash without adding borrowings. Spinning off part of the assets and cash flows into a subsidiary and selling equity in it is another possibility. Oracle's plan is not based on a single scenario. It keeps the investment path of option 1 (no capex freeze) and combines option 3 (leases/SPV), a variant of option 4 (customer prepayments), and a structure in which customers or third parties buy the hardware. It is a real-world example of our call that big tech will solve the cash problem through financing methods rather than by cutting investment. Fig. 7: Oracle's AI investment and funding plan vs. our "four option"-based scenarios Item Details vs. four options Investment path - Capex peaks in FY27-28 (Jun 2026-May 2028), and steps down from FY29- FY27 gross capex of USD90-95bn (net cash capex no more than USD70bn) Option 1 /Option 2 for longer-term FCF turn - FCF positive in 2H FY28 (Dec 2027-May 2028)- FY29 FCF of USD30bn or more Option 1 (J-curve) Long-term leases - USD288bn of not-yet-commenced data center leases(15-19 years, mostly operating leases)- Developers build and Oracle leases Option 3 Project SPV - About USD18bn of bank loans + USD3bn of Blue Owl equity- Oracle reportedly bears the debt costs and power responsibility(Similar to Meta Hyperion, but with stronger guarantee-like support) Option 3 Customer prepayments - USD11.4bn received in 1Q FY27, with a significant financing component(future cash received upfront from customers, but not sold to investors) Option 4 variant Customer-provided HW - Part of the backlog is contracted with customers supplying their own GPUs- Customer buys the equipment(Same effect as our 20% retained / 80% sold idea) New type Vendor financing Reduces upfront cash needs A form of borrowing Equity and debt - USD20bn ATM equity program completed in 1Q FY27- New capital raises through FY30 capped at USD20bn(USD10bn equity + USD10bn gross debt, excluding refinancing) Equity funding Leverage target - Net debt (including operating/finance leases and vendor financing)- Adjusted EBITDA below 3.5x by FY29 Rating-agency view built in Source: Company data, Nomura estimates Big tech's financial capacity: borrowing rises, but it is not a burden, and many funding options exist Even if FCF stays negative for several years as assumed under option 1, leverage should not move far outside its historical range, while equity grows quickly. The big four tech companies' equity was USD2.0tn at end-September 2026, and the companies are cutting shareholder returns, and in some cases issuing stock (Alphabet's USD12.4bn ATM issuance in 3Q). \- (Point 1) historical range: Big four's “(financial debt + operating leases) / equity” ratio was about 31% at end-2025 and about 42% at end-2022. We estimate that the peak will likely be at 2022 levels even through option 1 assumes negative-FCF years and falls quickly once FCF turns positive. \- (Point 2) equity growth: Rising profits and lower shareholder returns grow equity fast enough to absorb the extra borrowing. If returns continue, the ratio rises further. \- (Point 3) funding cost: Big tech companies still issue bonds at high-grade credit ratings, and the Hyperion SPV bonds are rated A+. Memory risk if data centers are oversupplied? Unlikely for several years The biggest risk, in our view, is a compute glut that leaves revenue per GW below expectations. Building and equipment depreciation is a fixed cost, so lower pricing hits profit directly. \- Big Tech's response to partial data center oversupply: (1) long-term supply contracts cushion price declines (see the backlogs mentioned above); (2) spare compute is redirected to model training, accelerating performance gains; and (3) capex growth is fine-tuned modestly. Point (2) works to re-stimulate demand through lower token prices and better performance. Overall, the impact on semiconductor demand is limited, we think. \- Unexpected severe data-centre oversupply (very unlikely near term; possible in the long run): Data center customers appear to procure about 80% of their total memory needs under LTAs with purchase obligations, and the rest outside LTAs. We estimate memory makers have about 50-70% of total volume locked into LTAs with a guaranteed minimum margin (we estimate operating margin of 60% or more). If LTA customers buy only their obligated volumes and cut purchases outside of LTAs (10-15% of total memory volume), some of that supply would ease severe shortages at other non-LTA customers, but non-LTA prices would stop rising and in the worst case could fall below protected LTA prices. Memory makers would then adjust capex plans or cut utilisation to find a new supply-demand balance. Their response is more flexible than in the past, and for memory makers, short-term profit and the bonuses of the employees who make decisions now matter more than short-term market share. \- Signs of data-centre oversupply are still weak: 3Q cloud growth accelerated (AWS +39%, Azure +48%, Google Cloud +103%), and Microsoft's capex fell short of plan because of third-party capacity delays. Indicators to watch: slowing cloud growth, GPU rental prices and backlog growth. ## Appendix A-1 This report has been produced by Nomura International (Hong Kong) Ltd. (NIHK), Hong Kong. See Disclaimers for Nomura Group entity details. ## Analyst Certification We, CW Chung, Eon Hwang and YJ Kim, hereby certify (1) that the views expressed in this Research report accurately reflect our personal views about any or all of the subject securities or issuers referred to in this Research report, (2) no part of our compensation was, is or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this Research report and (3) no part of our compensation is tied to any specific investment banking transactions performed by Nomura Securities International, Inc., Nomura International plc or any other Nomura Group company. ## Important Disclosures ## Online availability of research and conflict-of-interest disclosures Nomura Group research is available on www.nomuranow.com/research, Bloomberg, Capital IQ, Factset, LSEG. Important disclosures may be read at http://go.nomuranow.com/research/m/Disclosures or requested from Nomura Securities International, Inc. If you have any difficulties with the website, please email grpsupport@nomura.com for help. The analysts responsible for preparing this report have received compensation based upon various factors including the firm's total revenues, a portion of which is generated by Investment Banking activities. Unless otherwise noted, the non-US analysts listed at the front of this report are not registered/qualified as research analysts under FINRA rules, may not be associated persons of NSI, and may not be subject to FINRA Rule 2241 restrictions on communications with covered companies, public appearances, and trading securities held by a research analyst account. Nomura Global Financial Products Inc. (NGFP) Nomura Derivative Products Inc. (NDP) and Nomura International plc. (NIplc) are registered with the Commodities Futures Trading Commission and the National Futures Association (NFA) as swap dealers. NGFP, NDPI, and NIplc are generally engaged in the trading of swaps and other derivative products, any of which may be the subject of this report. ## Distribution of ratings (Nomura Group) The distribution of all ratings published by Nomura Group Global Equity Research is as follows: 60% have been assigned a Buy rating which, for purposes of mandatory disclosures, are classified as a Buy rating; 34% of companies with this rating are investment banking clients of the Nomura Group\*. 0% of companies (which are admitted to trading on a regulated market in the EEA) with this rating were supplied material services\*\* by the Nomura Group. 38% have been assigned a Neutral rating which, for purposes of mandatory disclosures, is classified as a Hold rating; 57% of companies with this rating are investment banking clients of the Nomura Group\*. 0% of companies (which are admitted to trading on a regulated market in the EEA) with this rating were supplied material services by the Nomura Group 2% have been assigned a Reduce rating which, for purposes of mandatory disclosures, are classified as a Sell rating; 17% of companies with this rating are investment banking clients of the Nomura Group\*. 0% of companies (which are admitted to trading on a regulated market in the EEA) with this rating were supplied material services by the Nomura Group. As at 30 September 2026. \*The Nomura Group as defined in the Disclaimer section at the end of this report. \*\* As defined by the EU Market Abuse Regulation ## Definition of Nomura Group's equity research rating system and sectors The rating system is a relative system, indicating expected performance against a specific benchmark identified for each individual stock, subject to limited management discretion. An analyst's target price is an assessment of the current intrinsic fair value of the stock based on an appropriate valuation methodology determined by the analyst. Valuation methodologies include, but are not limited to, discounted cash flow analysis, expected return on equity and…